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MUNICIPAL HOME RULE IN OHIO SINCE 1960
JOHN E. GoTHERMAN*
The scope of an article dealing with municipal home rule in Ohio
probably bears a direct relationship to the temerity of its author. Sixty
years after the adoption of the Ohio home rule amendmene and after
hundreds of cases have been decided, it would be a colossal task to un-
dertake a comprehensive review of municipal home rule. To review
the twelve years since 1960 is a more modest task but some review of the
basic principles and landmark cases prior to 1960 is still necessary. With
respect to the latter, this article will only highlight the development of the
case law and political science of municipal government prior to 1960. For
greater detail the dedicated scholar can examine the several excellent law
review articles covering the pre-1960 era.' This article will also omit utility
powers under the home rule amendment.'
I. PE-HomE RULE
In order to understand the structure of municipal government as it
exists today in Ohio, it is necessary to briefly review its historical develop-
ment. Prior to 1851 the underlying and controlling principle of munici-
pal government in Ohio relegated Ohio municipal corporations to a
status as creatures of the state government. The state legislature individu-
ally "chartered" each municipal or public corporation. In other words
the General Assembly provided the form, organization and structure of
each municipality in a special act which also provided for the powers
and functions of the municipality. Since a separate act was passed for each
municipality, the form of government and powers of each municipality
varied. As the state's population increased and urban areas developed,
the amount of special municipal legislation became burdensome.
In response to the growing problem of diverse municipal governments,
the constitution of 1851 provided "The General Assembly, shall provide
for the organization of cities and incorporated villages, by general laws.
* Member of the Ohio Bar, the author wishes to acknowledge the assistance of Craig E.
Evans, The Ohio State University College of Law.
2 OMIO CONSt. art. XVIIL
2 See generally Crawford, Restraints on Municipal Indebtedness In Ohio, 21 OHIo ST. L.J.
331 (1960); Duffey, Non-Charter Municipalities: Local Sell-Government, 21 OHIo ST. U.
304 (1960); Farrell, Municipal Public Utility Powers, 21 OfIo ST. LJ. 390 (1960); Pordham
& Asher, Home Rule Powers in Theory and Practice, 9 OHio ST. LJ. 18 (1948); Glander,
Analysis and Critique of State Pre-emption of Municipal Excise and Income Taxes under Ohio
Home Rule, 21 OMO ST. LJ. 343 (1960); Seasongood. Cincinnati and Home Rule, 9 OHo
ST. LJ. 98 (1948); Walker, Municipal Government in Ohio before 1912, 9 OHIo ST. LJ. 1
(1948).
3 For a comprehensive analysis of utilities regulation under the home rule amendment, se
Vaubel, Of Concern to Painesville-Or Only to the State: Home Rule in the Context of Utilities
Regulation, 33 OHIo ST. LJ. 257 (1972).
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" Section 1 of article XIII of that constitution provided, "The Gen-
eral Assembly shall pass no special act conferring corporate powers." 5
From these provisions it is obvious that the intent was to prohibit the type
of special legislation which gave rise to so many inequities. However,
the legislature soon established classes and grades of cities according to
population, and the result was the same as that produced by creating mu-
nicipal corporations by special act.
In 1902 two cases were decided that marked the end of legislative clas-
sification for Ohio municipalities,' causing considerable furor within the
state. Ohio's cities and villages were faced with the prospect of having no
municipal organization unless action were taken immediately. The gov-
ernor convened a special session of the legislature and S.B. No. 1 of that
special session was enacted providing for the organization of cities and
villages. To carry into effect the powers and duties conferred and imposed
upon then existing councils and other bodies, to provide the procedures
for conducting the first election to be held under the new statutes, and to
provide for the change in the organization of municipalities, the act took
effect November 15, 1902. For all other purposes the act was effective on
the first Monday in May 1903.
Statutorily planned cities and villages still follow much of the orga-
nizational pattern established by the special session of the Ohio General
Assembly in 1902. Of course there have been many amendments over
the years, but the basic framework remains substantially unchanged. As
created by the state government, municipal power in Ohio prior to home
rule is well described by Judge Dillon's rule:
It is a general and undisputed proposition of law that a municipal corpo-
ration possesses and can exercise the following powers and no others:
First, those granted in the express words; second, those necessarily or fairly
implied in or incident to the powers expressly granted; third, those essen-
tial to the accomplishment of the declared objects and purposes of the cor-
poration,-not simply convenient but indispensable. Any fair, reasonable,
substantial doubt concerning the existence of power is resolved by the courts
against the corporation, and the power is denied.7
The effect of Dillon's rule was to deny power to municipalities except
as conferred by the state legislature. That power was meager and the
stage was set for the revolutionary change which came in 1912 by means
of a constitutional amendment. Professor Harvey Walker's research of
the debates of the Constitutional Convention of Ohio reveals much of the
rationale behind the home rule amendment:
4 OIo CONST. art. XIII, §6 (1851).
5Id.
6 State ex rel. Knisely v. Jones, 66 Ohio St. 453, 64 N.E. 424 (1902); State v. Beacorn, 66
Ohio St. 491, 64 N.E. 427 (1902).
7 1 DILLON, MtUN. CORP. §237 (5th ed. 1911).
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Professor Knight explained that the proposal was designed to accomplish
three things: (1) to make it possible for different cities in the state of
Ohio to have, if they so desire, different forms and types of municipal
organization; (2) to get away from the rule that municipal corporations
shall be held strictly within the limit of the powers granted by the legisla-
ture and adopt the rule that cities shall have power to do all things with
reference to local government that are not prohibited; and (3) to clarify
and expand the power of municipalities to acquire and operate public util-
ities. "The proposal does not undertake," he said, "to detach cities from
the state, but it does undertake to draw as sharply and as clearly as pos-
sible the line that separates general state affairs from the business which is
peculiar to each separate municipality."8
On September 3, 1912, the electors of Ohio approved article XVIII of the
Ohio constitution-the home rule amendment, thus, making 1912 a land-
mark year in Ohio municipal government.
II. HIGHLIGHTS: 1912 TO 1960
A. Summaiy of Home Rule Amendment
Section 1 of the amendment provides:
Municipal corporations are hereby classified into cities and villages. All
such corporations having a population of five thousand or over shall be
cities; all others shall be villages. The method of transition from one class
to the other shall be regulated by law.9
Section 2 of article XVIII provides that general laws shall be passed to
provide for the incorporation and government of cities and villages. Pur-
suant to this constitutional mandate, the legislature has provided for the
incorporation of villages;10 however, provision has not been made for the
incorporation of a municipality as a city. For this reason all newly incor-
porated municipal corporations begin their existence as villages, regardless
of population at the time of incorporation.
The constitution specifically provides that the legislature shall regulate
the transition from village to city. The legislature has provided three
methods by which villages may attain city status. First, every ten years
the Bureau of the Census, U. S. Department of Commerce, conducts a
population census. After each decennial census the Secretary of State is-
sues proclamations for each municipal corporation. Those with a popula-
tion of 5,000 or more are proclaimed cities and those with a population
of less than 5,000 are proclaimed villages. A copy of the proclamation is
then sent to the mayor of the municipal corporation who must read it be-
fore the legislative authority of the municipality. Thirty days after the
issuance of the proclamation, the municipal corporation becomes a city or
8 Walker, supra note 2, at 13-14.
9 Omo CONSr. art. XVIII, § 1.
10 Omo REV. CODE ANN. §§ 707.01-707.30 (Page 1954).
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village, as the case may be." Second, a village may attain city status, or a
city may revert to village status, after a special federal census.1 2  Third,
any village which at the preceding general election had at least 5,000 resi-
dent electors registered with the county board of elec-tions or which had at
least 5,000 resident electors voting in such general election, becomes a city.
The board of elections immediately certifies to the Secretary of State the
number of resident electors registered or voting, the Secretary of State,
upon receiving this certification, issues a proclamation declaring that vil-
lage to be a city, a copy of the proclamation is sent to the mayor of the
municipal corporation, this copy is transmitted and read to the legislative
authority of the village, and thirty days after the issuance of the proclama-
tion the village becomes a city.' 3
Section 2 of article XVIII further provides that additional laws may be
passed "for the government of municipalities adopting same," but that
such additional laws shall not become operative until each has been sub-
mitted to the electors of the municipality and approved by a majority
vote. The General Assembly has provided for three alternative forms of
government that may be adopted.14
Section 3 of article XVIII is the heart of the home rule amendment:
Municipalities shall have authority to exercise all powers of local self-
government, and to adopt and enforce within their limits such local police,
sanitary and other similar regulations, as are not in conflict with general
laws.1 5
Sections 4, 5, 6, and 12 deal with the acquisition, operation and con-
trol of municipally owned utilities. The authority for municipalities to
adopt and amend charters is found in §§ 7, 8 and 9. This grant of power
liberated Ohio municipalities from the state's control over the form of
municipal government to be employed. This power has been most useful
to cities and villages, allowing them to adopt the form of government,
which local citizens feel best meets the local political, social and economic
needs. Article XVIII, § 10 deals with the power of municipal corpora-
tions to acquire private property for public uses. Section 11 relates to as-
sessments for the cost of appropriations. Section 12 pertains to bonds
for municipal utilities, § 13 limits the power of municipalities to incur
debt and levy taxes, and § 14 relates to elections provided for in article
XVIII.
B. Section 3, Article XVIII
One of the first points of argument which developed over the home
11 Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 703.06 (Page 1954).
12 Brubaker v. Brown, 163 Ohio St. 241, 126 N.E.2d 439 (1955).
13 OI o RE . CODE ANN. § 703.06 (Page 1954).
14 OIUO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 705.41-705.86 (Page 1954).
15 OHIo CONST. art. XVIII, § 3.
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rule amendment was whether § 3 was self executing or whether it required
the legislature to act in order to make home rule powers available to mu-
nicipalities. An early case, State ex. rel. Toledo v. Lynch,"' held a charter
to be a prerequisite to the exercise of the home rule powers under § 3.
In Perrysburg v. Ridgeway,17 however, the supreme court overruled Lynch,
holding that all municipalities derive their powers of local self government
directly from the constitution. The court held the grant of powers to be
self executing and not dependent upon legislation or the adoption of a
charter. 8
John J. Duffey, in his article on non-charter municipalities, said:
The key provision of article XVIII is section 3. To facilitate analysis and
discussion it can be broken into three parts:
(Clause 1) "Municipalities shall have authority to exercise all pow-
ers of local self-government"
(Clause 2) "and to adopt and enforce within their limits such local
police, sanitary and other similar regulations,"
(Clause 3) "as are not in conflict with general laws."
The first major issue in interpreting section 3 is the question of the appli-
cation of the "conflict" clause. Does it modify only the grant of police
powers or does it qualify the entire grant, i.e., powers of "local self-gov-
ernment" and "police" powers?19
In Fitzgerald v. Cleveland"0 the supreme court associated the "conflict"
clause exclusively with the police power (clause 2). A later decision,
State, ex. rel. Canada v. Phillips,2  seems to have finally settled the ques-
tion. In the fourth syllabus of Canada the supreme court held:
The words, "as are not in conflict with general laws" found in Section 3 of
Article XVIII of the Constitution, modify the words "local police, sani-
tary and other similar regulations" but do not modify the words "powers
of local self-government."22
C. Section 2, Article XVIII
Section 2, article XVIII, authorizes the adoption of general laws for
the following purposes:
1688 Ohio St. 71, 102 N.E. 67 0 (1913).
17 108 Ohio St. 245, 140 N.E. 595 (1923).
18 1. Since the Constitution of 1912 become operative, all muniipalities derive all
their "powers of local self-government" from the Constitution direct, by virtue of
Section 3, Article XVfll, thereof.
3. The above constitutional grant of power to municipalities is "self-executing," in
the sense that no legislative action is necessary in order to make it available to the
municipalities.
Id. at 245, 140 N.E. at 595.
L9 Duffy, supra note 2, at 308.
20 88 Ohio St. 338, 103 N.E. 512 (1913).
21 168 Ohio St. 191,151 N.E.2d 722 (1958).
22 Id. at 191, 151 N.E.2d at 724.
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(1) The incorporation of cities and villages.
(2) The establishment of alternative statutory forms of government
which have been approved by a vote of the people.
(3) The government of cities and villages.
In the exercise of its authority, the General Assembly has provided for
the incorporation of villages but not of citiesY2 Chapter 705 of the
Ohio Revised Code provides three alternative statutory forms of govern-
ment that may be adopted by the electors: (1) the Commission Plan,
(2) the City Manager Plan, and (3) the Federal plan, which is a strong
mayor form of government. Once adopted they may be changed by a
special election.2 4
Section 2 of article XVIII is also the basis for the statutory form of
government for non-charter municipalities. Title 7, Ohio Revised Code,
in its several chapters, fulfills the third goal of § 2 by providing the basic
form of government for general statutory cities and villages. The gen-
eral statutory plan for cities is a weak mayor form of government, for
non-charter villages, a combination of a weak mayor form and a commis-
sion plan in which the council shares administratyve functions with the
mayor.
In the landmark case of Morris v. Roseman2" the court held that pro-
cedures to be followed by non-charter municipalities are clearly con-
trolled by the statutes. In this case the non-charter village of Oakwood
passed a zoning ordinance as an emergency measure. The statutes required
a public hearing and a 30-day notice of the time and place of the hearing,
but the village contended that it possessed the authc ity, under § 3 of article
XVIII, to adopt an emergency zoning ordinance as a power of local
self government. The supreme court chose to limit the applicability of
the constitutional powers, held by local self governments over statutory
enactments, to "substantive powers" as distinguished from matters of
I"structure and procedure." Judge Zimmerman made th distinction very
dear in stating how the substantive power of zoning was to be exercised:
The Constitution of Ohio provides two ways. By Section 2, Article XVIII,
a mandatory duty is placed upon the General Assembly to enact laws for
the incorporation and government of cities and villages, and Section 7,
Article XVIII, grants a municipality the option of determining its own plan
of local self-government by framing and adopting a charter. If a munic-
ipality adopts a charter it thereby and thereunder has the power to enact
and enforce ordinances relating to local affairs, but, if it does not, its orga-
nization, and operation are regulated by the statutory provisions covering
the subject.
In other words, by Sections 3 and 7 of Article XVIII of the Constitu-
tion, a municipality has the power to govern itself lofally in certain re-
2 3 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 707.01-707.30 (Page 1954).
24 OHiO REV. CODE ANN. § 705.30 (Page 1954).
25 162 Ohio St. 447, 123 N.E.2d 419 (1954).
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spects. The statutes in no way inhibit such power but merely prescribe an
orderly method for the exercise of such power where the municipality
has not adopted a charter and set up its own governmental machinery
thereunder. 26
Professor Duffey accurately states the impact of Morris v. Roseman on
charter municipalities:
Under Morris the procedure for enacting an ordinance is a matter of "gov-
ernment" under section 2 and not a matter of "local self-government"
under section 3. Therefore, a charter municipality's power to establish
its own enactment procedure would logically be derived from section 7-
the power to adopt "a charter for its government." The opinion in Morris
appears to so state, although on its facts that is dearly not a holding. On
this approach, the charter does act as a grant with respect to enactment
procedure, and as a limitation with respect to section 3 "substantive"
powers. 27
III. DEVELOPMENTS SINCE 1960
A. All Powers of Local Self Government-
Sections 2 and 3, article XVIII
In 1960, State ex rel. Petit v. Wagner,28 one of the most troublesome
home rule cases, was decided; Professor Duffey's article9 devotes several
pages to a discussion of this case and points out that the rationale of Petit
is difficult to reconcile with Canada v. Phillips. In Petit, Judge Peck said:
This court has thus dearly recognized the distinction between the powers
of charter and non-charter municipalities [a reference to Morris v. Roseman
and Canada v. Phillips]. Clear evidence of the intention that such a dis-
tinction should exist is found in the very fact that the two provisions of
the Constitution hereinabove cited [an apparent reference to §§ 3 and 7]
were adopted as separate sections; if an identical extent of authority had
been intended to have been conferred, a single section would have abun-
dandy sufficed. By these two sections, the Constitution confers upon char-
ter cities and villages some greater degree of power not here required to be
defined but limits the general area of non-charter municipal authority.
There is in the present case a direct variance between the statute permit-
ting only members of a police department to take an examination of the
type here under consideration and the ordinance which contains no such
limitation, and it is our conclusion that such variance renders the ordi-
nance invalid. Differently stated, a non-charter municipality is without
authority under the provisions of Section 3, Article XVII of the Con-
stitution, to prescribe less restrictive qualifications for civil-service-examina-
tion [sic] applicants than are prescribed by statute, since such munid-
pal action would be at variance with the general laws.a0
26 Id. at 450, 123 N.E.2d at 422.
2 7 Duffy, supra note 2, at 320.
2 8 State ex rel. Petit v. Wagner, 170 Ohio St. 297, 164 N.E.2d 574 (1960).
29 Duffy, supra note 2, at 321-2.
30 170 Ohio St. at 303-4, 164 N.E.2d at 578.
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Petit v. Wagner could logically be explained as an extension of the
form of government procedure theory of Morris v. Roseman. But the last
sentence of the above quotation seems definitely to state that § 3 (deal-
ing with powers of local self government) and not § 2 (dealing with
structure and procedure) is the basis for invalid.ting a local ordinance
that is at variance with the general law. This view of Judge Peck's opin-
ion would seem to erode almost totally the doctrine of Perrysburg v.
Ridgeway, which held that all powers of local self government are ex-
tended to both charter and non-charter municipalities. The only local
self government powers which are left open to non-charter municipalities
under this view would be those areas not covered by a statute.
In the case of Leavers v. Canton3' Judge O'Neill summarized the
court's view of the application of § 3, article XVIII, to charter and non-
charter cities and villages:
Any ordinance dealing with police regulations passed by either a charter or
noncharter city, which is at a variance with state law, is invalid. Section
3, Article XVIII of the Ohio Constitution.
An ordinance passed by a charter city, which is not a police regulation
but which deals with local self-government, is valid and effective even
though it is at a variance with a state statute....
An ordinance passed by a noncharter city, which is not a police regu-
lation but is concerned with local self-government regulation, is valid
where there is no state statute at a variance with the ordinance....
An ordinance passed by a noncharter city, which is not a police regu-
lation but is concerned with local self-government, is invalid where such
ordinance is at a variance with state statute .... 32
Chief Justice Taft, in his concurring opinion to the Leavers decision,
would have supplied the final blow to the doctrine of Perrysburg v. Ridg.
way. He said that "as to noncharter municipalities, exercises of powers
of self government pursuant to Section 3 must be consistent with laws
enacted for their government pursuant to Section 2.'133
Both Petit and Leavers involved local efforts by non-charter cities to
avoid state laws imposing civil service procedures; Petit involved an ap-
pointment, and Leavers the removal or termination of services. The re-
sult of these cases could have been reached on a theory that such matters
were procedural in nature and, under the holding of Morris v, Roseman,
§ 2 authorized the legislature to adopt the procedures for civil service in
non-charter cities. In this author's opinion the durability of the rationale
of Petit v. Wagner will not be known until it is considered in the context
of a non-civil service case. Union Sand and Supply Corp. v. Fairport,14
31 1 Ohio St. 2d 33,203 N.E.2d 354 (1964).
32Id. at 37, 203 N.E.2d at 356-57 (citations omitted).
331d. at 38, 203 N.E.2d at 357 (Taft, C.J., concurring).
34 172 Ohio St. 387, 176 N.E.2d 224 (1961). This case involved the non.charter village of
Fairport Harbor.
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a case involving a non-charter village and decided in the period between
the Petit and Leavers cases, tends to support this opinion. In Union Sand
Judge Zimmerman said:
Of course, the state law (Section 5577.04 et seq., Revised Code, relating
to maximum loads) is operative generally, but it does not inhibit the exer-
cise of the powers of local self-government by municipalities in the rea-
sonable regulation as to weights of vehides- passing over their thorough-
fares.35
The court did not here use the theory of Petit v. Wagner to invalidate
the municipal ordinance, even though there was a clear variance with a
statute. The opinion does not discuss the rationale of Petit, but the two
cases are surely inconsistent, and the inconsistency could be used as the
basis for a reconsideration of the Petit and Leat'ers cases.
Municipalities are granted all powers of local self government under
§ 3, but only as to those matters relating to the government and adminis-
tration of the internal affairs of the municipality. Accordingly, the de-
tachment of territory from a municipality was held not to fall within the
sphere of local self government, but to be a subject requiring a uniform
procedure throughout the state and, therefore, within the exclusive control
of the General Assembly.3 6 Thus the court adopted the following test to
define the limits of local self government:
To determine whether legislation is such as falls within the area of local
self-government, the result of such legislation or the result of the pro-
ceedings thereunder must be considered. If the result affects only the
municipality itself, with no extra-territorial effects, the subject is dearly
within the power of local self-government and is a matter for the deter-
mination of the municipality. However, if the result is not so confined it
becomes a matter for the General Assembly.37
This result was consistent with an earlier decision involving the valid-
ity of an order of the State Department of Health to the City of Bucyrus
to install a sewerage system."' It was in the Bucyrus case that the court
introduced the "state-wide concern" doctrine:
It is a matter of concern to the whole state whether a municipality so dis-
pose of its sewage as to breed disease within the municipality, for the mu-
nicipality is of the public of the state; and it is equally a matter of con-
cern to the whole state whether a municipality so dispose of its sewage as
to breed disease without and in the vicinity of its own territory, and
whether, having bred disease in either situation, it disseminate it through-
out the state.a9
35 ld. at 391, 176 N.E2d at 226.
30 Beachwood v. Board of Elections, 167 Ohio St. 369, 148 N.E.2d 921 (1958).
37 Id. at 371, 148 N.E.2d at 923.
38 Bucyrus v. State Dep't. of Health, 120 Ohio SL 426, 166 N.E. 370 (1929).
39 Id. at 427-29, 166 N.E. at 371.
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In 1968 the supreme court held a state statute authorizing the construc-
tion of inter-city electric lines free from local regulation to be valid, the
case being Cleveland Electric Illuminating Co. v. Painesville,40  The
court there adopted the test set forth in Bucyrus to determine what con-
stitutes a matter of "state-wide concern." The decision written by Judge
Matthias stated:
Thus, even if there is a matter of local concern involved, if the regula-
tion of the subject matter affects the general public of the state as a whole
more than it does the local inhabitants the matter pas3es from what was a
matter for local government to a matter of general state interest.
As was said in the opinion in State, ex rel. McEiroy v. Akron, 173
Ohio St. 189, 192:
"Due to our changing society, many things which were once considered
a matter of purely local concern and subject strictly to local regulation,
if any, have now become a matter of statewide concern, creating the neces-
sity for statewide control." 41
It is therefore clear that the so-called "state-wide concern doctrine" remains
viable.
B. Police Power of Municipalities
In addition to granting all powers of local self government, § 3 of arti-
cle XVIII grants municipalities the power "to adopt and enforce with-
in their limits such local police, sanitary and other similar regulations, as
are not in conflict with general laws."'42  In an early case, Struthers v.
Sokol,43 the court spelled out the test for determining when a conflict
with the general laws exists. The syllabi of Struthers remain a helpful
guide in interpreting the conflict clause of § 3.
1. In determining whether an ordinance is in "conflict" with general laws,
the test is whether the ordinance permits or licenses ffat which the statute
forbids and prohibits, and vice versa.
2. A police ordinance is not in conflict with a general law upon the same
subject merely because certain specific acts are declared unlawful by the
ordinance, which acts are not referred to in the general law, or because
certain specific acts are omitted in the ordinance but referred to in the
general law, or because different penalties are provided for the same acts,
even though greater penalties are imposed by the municipal ordinance. 44
While municipal ordinances that conflict with general laws are invalid,
not all state statutes are general laws within the meaning of § 3. The
case of West Jefferson v. Robinson45 involved the validity of a Green
40 15 Ohio St. 2d 125, 239 N.E.2d 75 (1968).
41 Id. at 129, 239 NX.2d at 78.
42 OMo CONST. art. XVIII, § 3.
43 108 Ohio St. 263,140N.E. 519 (1923).
44 Id. at 263-64, 140 N.E. at 519-20.
45 1 Ohio St. 2d 113, 205 N.E.2d 382 (1965).
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River ordinance which made it a misdemeanor for an itinerant merchant
or a transient vendor to go uninvited on private property to solicit sales.
The defendant relied upon the conflict clause in his attempt to invalidate
the ordinance, arguing that although the statutes authorized municipali-
ties to grant licenses, they also provided certain exceptions from the power
to license. The defendant's business came within one of the exceptions.
In the syllabus the supreme court held:
3. The words "general laws" as set forth in Section 3 of Article XVIII
of the Ohio Constitution means [sic] statutes setting forth Folice, sani-
tary or similar regulations and not statutes which purport only to grant or
to limit the legislative powers of a municipal corporation to adopt or en-
force police, sanitary or other similar regulations 43
In other words, the court here recognized that there are two types of stat-
utes. One type directly establishes police, sanitary or similar regulations
applicable to the general public, and the court defines this type as a
.,general law." The second type directly regulates the police, sanitary or
similar regulations promulgated by municipal corporations, and the court
defines this type as not "general law."
The West Jefferson case followed a previous holding, Youngstown v.
Evans, 4 which struck down § 715.67 of the Ohio Revised Code, a statute
limiting the maximum punishment that may be imposed by municipal ordi-
nance to a fine of $500 or six months imprisonment. In Youngstown,
Chief Justice Marshall stated that the statute ".... is not a general law in
the sense of prescribing a rule of conduct upon citizens generally. It is' a
limitation upon law making by municipal legislative bodies." ' s Thus, the
case law is now settled that in order to be a general law under the conflict
clause of § 3, the state must be exercising its police power in a substantive
way and not merely enacting a statute to limit or prohibit the exercise of
police power by municipalities.
Another significant case, Auxter v. Toledo,149 was decided in 1962. The
plaintiff operated a beer and wine carry out under a state license. Toledo
passed an ordinance prohibiting the sale of beer without a city license.
The court held that the Toledo ordinance conflicted with a state statute.
Judge Taft said, "Even though plaintiff has a state license authorizing him
to carry on the business of selling beer in Toledo, the ordinance prohibits
him from doing so if he does not pay for and secure a municipal license
to do so."0 The ordinance was thus declared invalid as in conflict with a
general law.
In a similar case decided earlier the same year, the supreme court held
46 Id. at 113, 205 N.E.2d at 383.
47 121 Ohio St. 342, 168 N.Y. 844 (1929).
48 Id. at 345, 168 N.E. at 845.
49 173 Ohio SL 444, 183 NY..2d 920 (1962).
5o Id. at 447, 183 N.E.2d at 923.
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that the state had pre-empted the power of municipalities to license water-
craft." In deciding this case Judge Radcliffe, relying on a well-known
case involving the pre-emption doctrine as applied to the power of taxa-
tion of municipalities, said:
We having determined the facts that the state license constitutes an ex-
cise tax, and that the state properly entered the field, it necessarily fol-
lows that the state has pre-empted the field, and municipalities can no
longer levy a license tax on watercraft. Haefner, a Taxpayer v. City of
Youngstown, 147 Ohio St. 58.52
In the syllabus to the case, the statute was referred to as "a valid exer-
cise of the police power by the state. '"5 3 If state boat licensing were an
exercise of the state's police power, rather than its power of taxation, the
court's holding should have been based on the conflicts clause of § 3,
article XVIII, rather than on pre-emption-a doctrine applicable only to
taxation.
In the case of Anderson v. Brown,61 the court followed its prior decision
of Auxter v. Toledo, holding in the syllabus that:
3. A license for the operation of a house trailer park issued by the dis-
trict board of health pursuant to Section 3733.06, Revised Code, gives
the person to whom it is issued the right to operate such a park, and a
municipal ordinance which prohibits the operation of such a park within
the limits of the municipality without a municipal license, which is ob-
tainable only upon paying a fee, is in conflict with Section 3733.06, Re-
vised Code: (Auxter v. Toledo, 173 Ohio St. 444, approved and fol-
lowed. Section 3733.06, Revised Code, and Section 3, Article XVIII of
the Ohio Constitution, construed and applied.)65
It is clear that where the state has exercised its police power through
licensing, a municipal exercise of police power by licensing at the local
level results in a conflict under § 3, and the municipal licensing measure
is, therefore, invalid. However the court has rejected the argument that
comprehensive regulation and licensing of the sale of liquor by the state
has pre-empted municipalities in the field of regulation. In Cleveland v,
Raffa56 Judge O'Neill said: "While pre-emption by implication has been
held to exist in the area of state and local taxation . . . considerations of
double taxation and tax sharing between the state and municipalities mo-
tivated the implication of pre-emption. . . .These factors, however, are
not relevant here."57
51 State ex rel. McElroy v. Akron, 173 Ohio St. 189, 181 N.E.2d 26 (1962).
521d. at 195, 181 N.E.2d at 30.
531d. at 189, 181 N.E.2d at 27.
54 13 Ohio St 2d 53, 233 N.E.2d 584 (1968).
55 Id. at 54, 233 N.E.2d at 586.
56 13 Ohio St 2d 112,235 NB.2d 138 (1968).
57M. at 115, 235 N.E.2d at 141.
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A municipal ordinance that makes an offense a misdemeanor is in con-
flict with a statute that makes the same offense a felony.58 However, when
the only difference between a municipal ordinance and a state statute
proscribing conduct and providing punishment is in the severity of pun-
ishment (both being misdemeanors), there is no conflict under § 3.';
C. Welfare of Employees-Section 34, Article II
It is dear from case law that other provisions of the Ohio constitution
may limit the home rule powers of municipalities. Section 34 of article
II provides:
Laws may be passed fixing and regulating the hours of labor, establish-
ing a minimum wage, and providing for the comfort, health, safety and
general welfare of all employees; and no other provision of the constitu-
tion shall impair or limit this power... .0
The creation and the administration, management, and control of a
state police and firemen's disability and pension fund, as provided in §§
742.01 to 742.49, inclusive, of the Revised Code has been held to be a
valid enactment of the General Assembly by virtue of § 34, article II of
the constitution of Ohio.61 The recent Pension Fund case may prove to be
'n important precedent for upholding a state imposed system of collec-
tive bargaining between municipalities and labor organizations, when such
statutes are enacted.
D. Municipal Charters
A recent amendment to § 9, article XVIII, approved at the November,
1970, election, permits notice of charter amendments to be given by (1)
mailing copies of the proposed amendments to the electors not less than
30 days prior to the election, or (2) newspaper advertising pursuant to
laws passed by the General Assembly. Under the prior section all amend-
ments were required to be mailed and newspaper advertising was not
permitted. Since the new provision permitting newspaper advertising
was not self-executing, a statute was enacted which provided for news-
paper notice of charter amendments to be made as follows:
(B) The full text of the proposed charter amendment shall be published
once a week for not less than two consecutive weeks in a newspaper pub-
lished in the municipal corporation, with the first publication being at least
fifteen days prior to the election at which the amendment is to be sub-
mitted to the electors. If no newspaper is published in the municipal
58 Cleveland v. Betts, 168 Ohio St. 386, 154 N.E.2d 917 (1958).
59 Toledo v. Best, 172 Ohio St. 371, 176 N.Y.2d 520 (1961).
6 0 0mo CoNsr. art U, § 34.
61State ex rel. Bd. of Trustees of Pension Fund v. Board of Trustees of Relief Fund, 12
Ohio Sr. 2d 105, 233 N.E.2d 135 (1967).
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corporation, then such publication shall be made in a newspaper of general
circulation within the municipal corporation. 2
Municipalities having charters that recite or paraphrase the previous
constitutional language requiring mail notice of charter amendments may be
required to amend their charters before they can take advantage of the
less expensive newspaper notice, because the charter itself has determined
which of the two alternatives shall be followed.
The increase, by charter amendment, of an inctmbent mayor's term
from two to four years does not constitute a retroactive law as that term
is used in § 28, article II, of the Ohio constitution. Further, a board of
elections may not refuse to place a charter amendment on the ballot be-
cause it believes that the amendment would be illegal."3
Section 1 (f) of article II of the Ohio constitution provides:
The initiative and referendum powers are hereby reserved to the people of
each municipality on all questions which such municipalities may now or
hereafter be authorized by law to control by legislative action; such pow-
ers shall be exercised in the manner now or hereafter provided by law.04
The charter of the City of Oxford exempted ordinances raising revenue
from the application of referendum procedures. A mandamus action
was filed in the supreme court to require the city to submit an ordinance
which levied an income tax to a referendum vote."' In his opinion Judge
Leach said:
Essentially, we have held that Section if of Article II (as contrasted to
Section id of Article II) is not "self-executing"; that either the General
Assembly, by the enactment of statutory "law," or the people of the mu-
nicipality, by the adoption of charter "law" under the "home rule" provi-
sions of the Constitution, may exempt certain classes of laws from the
operation of the referendum, if "the laws so to be exempt d comply as to
their character to the provisions of Section Id of Article II" (Shyroek,
supra, page 384); that charter provisions, if so adopted, will apply (Dillon,
supra, paragraph three of the syllabus); R.C. 731.41; and that where there
are no charter provisions the exercise of such power is only as provided for
by the General Assembly (Dubyak, supra, paragraph one of the syllabus).08
In 1930 the court held in Phillips v. Hume67 that the requirements
for advertising and bidding, as set forth in the general laws, must be fol-
lowed by charter cities because they were a limitation on the debt power of
62 OoREV. CODE ANN. § 731.211(B) (Page Supp. 1971).
63 State ex rel. McGovern v. Board of Elections of Cuyahoga County, 24 Ohio Misc. 135
(1970).
64 OHo CoNsr. art II, § I(f).
6 5 State ex rel. Bramblette v. Yordy, 24 Ohio St. 2d 147, 265 N.E.2d 273 (1970).
66 Id. at 149, 265 N.E.2d at 274. Citations to cases included in this quotation are: Shyrock
v. Zanesville, 92 Ohio St. 375, 110 N.E. 937 (1915); Dillon v. Cleveland, 117 Ohio St. 258,
158 N.E. 606 (1927); Dubyak v. Kovach, 164 Ohio St. 247, 129 N.E.2d 809 (1955).
67 122 Ohio St. 11, 170 N.E. 438 (1930).
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municipalities under § 6, article XIII, and § 13, article XVIII, of the Ohio
constitution. In State ex rel. Cronin v. Wald"8 the court overruled
Phillips v. Hume. In this landmark case Judge Stem stated:
Although the General Assembly can, under the provisions of Section 13,
Article XVIII, and Section 6, Artide XIII, of the Ohio Constitution,
limit a municipality's aggregate indebtedness, it may not, under those sec-
tions, prescribe the manner and method which a municipal corporation
must follow in setting the actual monetary amount of expenditures which
could be made without councilmanic authorization. As RC. §§ 715.18
and 735.05 do specify such a procedure, among other requirements, they
are not debt limitations within the meaning of those constitutional provi-
sions. If a city charter provision pertaining to the procedure for limiting
the amount of money which a city may contract to expend conflicts with
a state law, the charter provision prevails as a valid exercise of the home
rule power.69
Charter cities and villages are free to provide monetary limitations for bid-
ding on municipal contracts without regard to the statutory limitations
under Cronin.
Other cases involving municipal charters and the home rule amend-
ment, decided since 1960, have held the following: A municipal charter
requiring an opportunity for competition in the sale of real property
limits the power granted by § 3 to exercise all powers of local self govern-
ment, including the power to sell real property not needed for municipal
purposes; 70 the mayor of a charter city does not have the authority to veto
an ordinance which submits a proposed amendment to that charter to the
electors, since § 9 provides the only valid procedure for submission of a
charter amendment. 71 This is consistent with the theory that all charter
provisions which establish procedures for amending charters different from
those provided by the constitution-such as authority for a charter re-
view commission to submit amendments to a vote-are invalid; a charter
provision authorizing group petitions for council candidates is proper, since
municipal elections are a matter of local concern. 2  A municipal charter
may distribute legislative powers among the various municipal bodies
and officers other than the council because the doctrine of separation of
powers is not applicable to charter cities, and thus a charter may also invest
more than one municipal body with both legislative and executive pow-
ers and duties.73 A charter provision may authorize salary increases dur-
ing the term of elected offices,74 and a charter may authorize the city man-
68 26 Ohio St. 2d 22, 268 N.E.2d 581 (1971).
69 Id. at 27, 268 N.Y.2d at 584-85.
70 Youngv. Dayton, 12 Ohio St. 2d 71,232 N.E.2d 655 (1967).
71 Beflington v. Comer, 25 Ohio St. 2d 140, 267 N.E2d 410 (1971).
72 Stare ex rel Haffey v. Miller, 4 Ohio Sr. 2d 29, 211 N.E.2d 830 (1965).
73 Avon Lake v. Burke, 115 Ohio App. 541, 186 N-2d 94 (1962).
74 Loux v. Lakewood, 120 Ohio App. 415, 193 N.E.2d 710 (1963), appeal dismilred, 176
Ohio St. 154, 198 N.E.2d 68 (1964).
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ager to cause a suit to be commenced without special authorization by
council. 5
IV. LOOKING AHEAD
What will be the burning issues of home rule in the decade to come?
Certainly a law review article is not an appropriate vehicle for prophecy,
but some speculation is justifiable in the study of municipal home rule.
One issue likely to be raised again is the soundness of the rationale em-
ployed in Petit v. Wagner. If the supreme court continues to follow
Petit, as it did in Leavers v. Canton, few innovative powers of local self-
government will be available to non-charter municipalities and, conse-
quently, charter adoptions will multiply at a more rapid rate than in the
past. It is this writer's opinion that the high court will find it as conven-
ient to depart from the theory of Petit as it was to create it, given the right
factual context. The result of Petit in procedural civil service matters
can be more rationally achieved by a "procedure-structure" theory under
§ 2 and Morris v. Roseman than it can under the variance concept articu-
lated by Judge Peck.
How will home rule weather structural reforms in local government?
Is municipal home rule an obstacle to reform in the structure of local
government? Can the General Assembly, in light of municipal home
rule, provide workable procedures for the merger, consolidation, detach-
ment of territory, and dissolution of municipalities? Not all of these
questions can be answered by reference to existing case law. In Beach-
wood v. Board of Elections78 the supreme court upheld the validity of a
detachment statute against the contention of the plaintiff village that de-
tachment is a matter of local self government under § 3, article XVIII.
Dean Jefferson B. Fordham in his article on home rule powers stated:
The whole province of annexation, disannexation, merger, consolidation
and dissolution doubtless lies beyond the reach of home rule powers. The
Home Rule Amendment is silent as to all of these matters. All but dis-
solution involve elements which transcend a particular municipality.
Provision for original incorporation is expressly left in state hands.
Is not the question whether municipal existence will be continued also un-
der state control? Home rule powers are granted to municipalities. It
would seem that they presuppose continued existence and do not embrace
self-destruction.77
I agree with the conclusions of Dean Fordham. If the constitution
provides an adequate procedure for county charters, home rule and alter-
native statutory forms, if the General Assembly faces up to consolidation,
75 Marysville v. Boerger, 20 Ohio App. 2d 61,251 N.E.2d 628 (1969).
76 167 Ohio St. 369, 148 N.X.2d 921 (1958).
77 Fordham & Asher, supra note 2, at 69.
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dissolution and annexation, and if the conclusions of Dean Fordham and
this writer are correct, there is little likelihood that municipal home rule
will obstruct or impede the reorganization of local governments. Leth-
argy among political and civic leaders, social stresses, the emergence of
black power in central cities, and the vested interests of political parties
and private groups are influences more persuasive in maintaining the
status quo than is municipal home rule. Home rule is a viable doctrine,
capable of changing with the times. It is clear under the existing cases
that the will of the people of the state generally prevails over the will of
the people of a particular municipality in important areas. Especially illus-
trative of state superiority are the following examples:
(1) The General Assembly may pass laws to limit the power of
municipalities to levy taxes and incur debt for local purposes under § 13
of article XVIII. (This power is often exercised by the state.)
(2) The exercise of police powers by the state dearly prevails
over conflicting police regulations by municipalities by virtue of the con-
flict clause of § 3, article XVIII.
(3) The state controls the form of government, structure, and proce-
dure of non-charter municipalities under § 2, article XVIII.
(4) Section 3 "powers of local self government" is limited to the
internal affairs of the municipality, as opposed to those matters of "state-
wide concern" or "not purely local in nature," following such cases as
Bucyrus and Beachwood.
(5) The variance concept under Petit v. Wagner relegates non-char-
ter municipalities to the exercise of all powers of local self government
in a manner not at variance with state law.
(6) The state has the authority to enact legislation affecting the wel-
fare of its employees under § 34, article II, as held in the Police and Fire
Pension Fund case. 7s
(7) The state has control over incorporation under § 2, article XVIII,
and probable control over matters involving annexation, detachment,
merger, consolidation, and dissolution as suggested by Dean Fordham.29
Surely no one having even a passing knowledge of these limitations
on municipal home rule powers would seriously suggest that article XVIII
materially impedes innovation in local government.
7 8 State ex rel. Bd. of Trustees of Pension Fund v. Board of Trustees of Relief Fund, 12 Ohio
St. 2d 105, 233 N.E.2d 135 (1967).
79 Fordham & Asher, supra note 2.
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